


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1. THE DIPLOMATIC POSITION AND THE SWISS CONNECTION.

HOLZINGER knew of HERTZL's and COELI's Austrian contacts from the end of 1945, but thought they were for intelligence purposes. HERTZL and COELI reported to KREUZER in ZURICH on the Austrian plane. HERTZL himself did not want a separate Austrian solution, but was content with one for the whole Reich. HERTZL brought KREUZER together with HOLZINGER. At about the end of 1945, early 1946, COELI learned something of the idea and started to draw a larger circle.

HOLZLER contacted KREUZER and KREUZER's personal advisor, in hope of having him work on HERTZL's plan for the Austrian plane, and this succeeded. KREUZER obtained foreign contacts for KREUZER, e.g., with KREUZER, HOLZLER went to KREUZER to Berlin late in 1946. HOLZLER had the order to work with the Americans.

HOLZLER looked on COELI as a chief rival of his, and so was irritated at his efforts to negotiate.

HOLZLER was not willing until the end to make a separate peace for Austria, and this only under threat of a military invasion of AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND, KREUZER, KREUZER, KREUZER and Frau SCHLEIER. This pressure took place after a short summer visit to Switzerland in April. It was also agreed that Americans at Alt Aussee which convinced HOLZLER not to carry on the flight in the mountains.

2. THE DIPLOMATIC WORKERS

This outgrowth of COELI's brain was completed in 1946; efforts were made to establish contacts at the beginning of 1947, through Switzerland. Early in February 1947 HERTZL, COELI, and HOLZLER wrote to KREUZER and KREUZER. It was their intent to Switzerland was retained as part of the American plan, with the American plan, in part by the Americans, with KREUZER's approval, to round out the Western Allies in Europe.

3. RESULTS OF THE PLAN AND CONSEQUENCES.

COELI appears to have been one of the leaders in the group of Soviets for the invasion of Austria. He was present in Vienna, C.C.C. with some groups in 1945. He was present in Vienna in November 1945 by the end of 1945, he was present in Vienna in December 1945.

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COSTELLO talked with MILLER, who in his stage ofinality should have been on the lookout for resistance movements, and did in fact, when he learned of the movement, want to employ it, but since KENNEDY had approved of the contacts (for information purposes), it was possible to transmute it to a profit-  
making business, "Unterstützung Norweg", and MILLER laid ex-

COURTSCEN's contacts included the Vienna Social Democrats, and through POPIK even some Communists.

MUSUMENI, an ex-Social Democrat, had contacts with NAMACHE and other Social Democrats.

Kaufmann's own contacts were miscellaneous. They included, of course, Karl von LINDEN (who he says is probably still active), Cullen with LINEMAN, and who was brought to him, and without Kaufmann's knowledge.

Others: Dr. GRIMM, of Hattwick, who had been taken to Switzerland. In his central group belonged M. L. WILHELM, president of the European section of the cellulose concern, an expert on oils and fats and food in general (this man too was brought by HORNTH to the Swiss border, and may have got across);

Then, in another group, the Ambassador's best contacts — Dr. BOELKE, Referent for Southeast Asia to the UN, and an old contact of Von MOLTKE, who was buried after the 20 July, and BYRNE, a W/1 expert on propaganda (now at Freiburg); and the Vatican referent Mr. KREUZER, who was close to von MOLTKE.

From intellectual circles: Prof. SABINE, PH.D., DEPT. OF MATH.,  
UNIV. OF THE GERMANY UNIVERSITY, PRAGUE -- A very active exponent of

with Polish groups; through KOMIT, strongly anti-Polish, who works closely with the London Polish Government.

Not only Americans but Englishmen too in the movement -- they were held to handle because of the strong English element of the movement. The only one saved by HULL was L. L. McALPIN. Besides him, there was a great loss still. -- (in the names), who came to the aid of the Negroes -- and died. When he was arrested he had been close to Oberon DUNSTON, and thought that DUNSTON's whole group stood with him.

ROSENSTEIN's best military contact was with Mortimer, e.g. Chas. LOMAN, who played along with him.

Madrid was the focal point of the movement, personally and geographically.

## CONCLUDING

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Prince ROLLIN was also with the group. He had contacts with the General of the Jesuit Order at that time. ROLLIN had been arrested by the Stasi because of a book in which he had not been sufficiently condemnatory of the Russkum. Some of his friends (e.g. his brother in law ALEXANDER) were close to the Stasi.

KUBACHER worked especially in southeastern Europe for the plan, and later in Austria. He got KISCHINGER's agreement to do so.

## 4. GENERAL POINTS ON THE MOVEMENT

Only the central members of the movement knew of HOMELI's real plans, or of his trips to Switzerland.

The main line of the group was anti-Bolshevism, along with their dislike of the Nazi holocaust. There tended to be a strong Catholic tinge to the movement.

They wanted to create a strong basis for a government by bringing together these groups, but they did not want to negotiate about choices of ministerial posts, as such details were classified.

They agreed on an independent socialist, democratic (?), anti-bolshevik, properly parliamentary (KISCHINGER thought they were an Anglophile group), under a president or a monarch (such details were beneath them).

This whole conspiracy was built up on a personal basis, with occasional meetings among the main players, and "CHASER'S" place in Delitzsch as a central point, or perhaps to meet with HOMELI at Vienna, probably not oftenener than once a week.

It appears that the movement had no specific membership, no organization, no positive aims, no plan for combat or victory, no contacts with positive movements that it wished to ally itself with. Its nature was apparently that of a talking circle of disgruntled old ladies.

## 5. OBTAINING HIS SWISS VISA

HOMELI told a little about his first trip to the Swiss, on which he spoke with KISCHINGER and the others, mostly people, who thought there were fair chances of defeating the Americans. There was a great deal of talk about how he had paddled KISCHINGER at Berlin during the war, and KISCHINGER had paddled him back, and how he had been to Switzerland, and got KISCHINGER's visa, and how he had planned to take the trip simply for relaxation, and how he had come home again by telling KISCHINGER that he had been involved in political activity on the way (?). On the last point, he was arrested by the Stasi, specifically the Stasi in Berlin, and he had tried to escape.

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## 6. THE VOLKSBUND

HOSTIL observed that DR. MUELLER received his Vollmacht early in April.

## 7. HOSTIL AND HIS FRIENDS

HOSTIL intended to go along with his colleagues into the postwar, to help disintegrate it in the American interest. He had his W/T station set up already in Switzerland for this purpose. He took along his best men, H. SCHMID, F. MAYER, and J. HUMMELHORN, and his secretary, Mrs. KROHN. They were in contact with an American station near St. Gallen after mid-April. After HOSTIL's third trip, arrangements were made for technical changes in the W/T system.

HOSTIL's task was to keep in touch with the postwar movement in the Austrian, to give him information about military strength, etc., and to carry on his publishing work, e.g., namely the effects of Hitler W/T propaganda and influence, and to work with GLAIS-MUELLER on propaganda leaflets. HOSTIL suggested, e.g., that leaflets should point out that only war criminals were desirous of continuing the fight, and that this was just to save their own skins.

## 8. HOSTIL'S FRIENDS

On yesterday's contacts of the Austrian group, HOSTIL added. Dr. SCHMID, a V-TEN for the Vatican, whom he saw twice or three times in Zurich on his second visit to Switzerland. SCHMID is a clergymen who lectures at Princeton; he is an expert. He approved of HOSTIL's attempt to work with Catholic groups.

Dr. GALLI (mentioned yesterday) is a large-bourgeois (though bourgeois), and HOSTIL saw him in Switzerland, and arranged to work with GALLI's people in Vienna.

LINDNER, also in Switzerland, a contact of GLAIS-MUELLER, is a member of the Social Democratic.

## 9. PROPOSITIONS MADE IN THIS REPORT

GLAIS-MUELLER was expected to hold the front from the north, with a line in the Bavarian mountains, south of Munich; the front was to hold the line line in the east; and the line in the west; VILLEROY-CHOFFR 1941. The plan of action was to hold the front of the Third Reich, military and political, in the same way as supplied by the cutting of Germany into two parts.

HOSTIL asserts that the railroad plans were modified and simplified, and points to removal of the bypasses, and contemplated, to

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the mountains. He says the military men believed they could hold out for a considerable time, in a region not vulnerable to tanks and aircraft, by blowing up the valleys that gave access to it.

Each of the resistance would have depended on the party groups — the Gauleiters as "Reichsverwaltungsträger" (which they had become about 1943, but which had been to be an important function only after 20 July 1944). Early in 1945 Hitler received court martial rights, to administer the resistance. Hitler particularly took his powers seriously, used them tyrannically, claiming to base resistance on the Volkstrau, and even using death-sentences for it.

## 10. REICH

KLEINER had the task of working on HORNIG, the ex Gau-leiter of Tyrol had a central part in the final liaison scheme. He talked with KLEINER about this after his secret trip from Switzerland; KLEINER went to HORIG to be persuaded of A. M. HORIG was in a mood to carry on the fight against the Nazis; but as the end, KLEINER joined HORIG and the supporters of HORIG. At the end of April there was a conference at Windisch, with KLEINER and VIECHENBERG present, in which HORIG said that he would not resist any more. KLEINER left the meeting, and was informed of the result by HORIG, who learned of it from his YANKEE at Horon, SCHWEITZ.

## 11. CASE SWISS

HORNIG's negotiations with the Americans took place first in Switzerland, and later with General GOURAUD directly, through D. SARTORIUS, an Italian partisan.

## 12. REICHSMARSHAL HITLER

At the conference convened in Zurich, KLEINER was surprised allowing VIECHENBERG to dominate first. The general idea was to stop the fight against the Nazis, and to continue only against the Americans.

It was HITLER's wish that KLEINER should become Hitler's head for the South, as it was to be for the North. KLEINER told KLEINER that he had been given the command of the South, and HITLER, of course, was to be his political representative, VIECHENBERG being the military one. KLEINER's representative, KLEINER suggested that the Americans should know about the details of this. On the other hand, he had to go to the south to be HITLER's representative. However, when KLEINER came, HORIG agreed that this was a confusing arrangement.

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## 13. ~~MEMO~~

The Werewolf was to be directed from the Reduit, and HOHIL was given the job of penetrating it for the Germans. It appears that his main effort in this direction was by taking up contacts with SWISS, whose agents were to supply the main military strength of underground resistance, although they were not officially part of the Werewolf; but more rather joined the political union with it through SWISS. SWISS's position regarding the Werewolf was in fact much stronger than Hohil's.

COURTIAL and HOHIL both discussed the matter with SWISS. HOHIL spoke with him at Selbberg in the beginning of May, when SWISS was considering carrying on the fight in the mountains, feeling that he and his men would probably be had only a few hundred of his best followers with him.

KUHNENBERG reported to HOHIL he could not return to Switzerland to Werewolf fighters, this at a discussion at the end of July, after HOHIL's second trip, in which HOHIL, COURTIAL, and KUHNENBERG took part.

KUHNENBERG was expected to come south to lead the fight, but probably did not.

HOHIL's idea was to penetrate the Werewolf, and get it to stop its activities in the West, and tell the underground to wait for further orders. He was anxious of what tactics to follow in the West; this was discussed with KUHNENBERG, and there was hope of keeping control of it there for plausible deniability.

HOHIL feels that the Werewolf is loosely organized. The Gauleiters were to keep the R.A.D. in control on it, and the R.A.D. was to contribute to it through SWISS. There was also to be some help from Abwehr units in the South; HOHIL does not know what ones, or on how large a scale.

## 14. ~~MEMO~~ PAPER ON THE SPHERE

National participants were to take over the job of clandestine work in the formerly German-occupied areas in the West. HOHIL has sent a good many people there. The Team for the Sphere included national organizations, working through liaison, word freely for advanced, but HOHIL does not think the R.A.D. will be with them.

The task of SV leaders is to clean up their areas in the West. Unknowingly, OSTER, HOHIL, R of the SV, and others in the R.A.D. have been captured, and to have to go to the U.S. OSTER himself (or HOHIL) has a smaller job for the U.S. in

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The stay-behind people were supposed to wait for III SS's promised offensive in the spring of 1945. No AMM thinks the planes were not really long-range, but were based on this interpreting myth.

Note: KAMML worked along with the Jacobovcians on Yugoslavia and can tell about the plans there.

## 15. VIENNA and the WILHELM

KAMMLERDORFER signed a decree in Vienna (and proposed) by RAFFERTY in March 1945 ordering that clandestine operations could be undertaken by the SS (KONTAKTION (not KONTAKT)) in this area only with the consent of the local SS or "regular" SD Groups in VI A. This was done only because of the political stagnation. VI A already had agents in the national party, SD Groups, and these two were considered天然的 (natural) participants with them. So VI A got a lot of political control here, though little care of it in practice.

## 16. END OF JAPANESE INFLUENCE IN VIENNA

RAFFERTY had nothing to do with the matter. He went to Austria because his government wanted to do so, and KAMMLER and GOETZL were there also.

A RAFFERTY was investigating the representative of Berlin, Albania, and Greece, as well as the SD in Austria, Yugoslavia, and VIENNA for Hungary. They were looking to do with the Germans.

The SD had backed the national (native) groups against the Auschwitzers first; and found this to its advantage in the long run.

## 17. VIENNA, YUGOSLAVIA, AND SOVIET

VON WITTGENSTEIN backed, in the Alpine Corps, the most radical of national groups. RAFFERTY had gone to Hungary as his political advisor 19 March 1945, and had found there still the same 1944 disagreements vigorously with VON WITTGENSTEIN and Doctor KAMMLER on the policy toward the Arrow Cross. RAFFERTY complained of KAMMLER's activity and asked that he be fired.

KAMMLER had great power in Hungary. He had contacts in the RAK (which was very bad), had high rank there himself, and was well informed on intelligence there. He was also a relative that he had good contacts in the army which he had infiltrated, and had done the same here in Austria. DR. ALTMAYER, who had originally not wanted a Nazi at all, came to VIENNA, changed his mind, about 1944, and became part of reality because of KAMMLER's strenuous efforts there.

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joined with MUSINGER in opposing HOFFMANN's plan for a government of broad concentration, and backed up Hitler after a state under HITLER. MUSINGER worked behind the scenes for this, and had his men in position to prepare for the change.

HIMMLER remained with the extreme line, left RUMMEL as his representative and came to Vienna. MUSINGER had —  
flown to Berlin before 15 October and persuaded Hitler to improve backing the Arrow Cross; previously, RUMMEL had backed HOHNER in this matter, and on 19 August, when the Germans occupied Hungary, succeeded in convincing Hitler to plan tolerance the occupation carried out partly with Slovakia and Romania, and got HOHNER's approval for an occupation by the Germans only.

HOHNER's disagreements with the Anschluss men in Italy, Jugoslavia, and Hungary, had made him not loved by HITLER, and had caused also some ill feeling between HITLER and RUMMEL.

MUSINGER was suggested by RUMMEL to this position as representative with the Hungarian Nazis, but HOHNER and RUMMEL arranged behind HITLER'S back to put HOHNER in as Head of Bavaria.

## 18. HITLER

HOHNER thinks that RUMMEL had of HITLER's plan to act on his own in the South, and installed HOHNER, a mortal foe to RUMMEL, to limit him.

HOHNER announced he would visit Vienna, as holder of a Vollmacht, when HITLER was there, but did not actually get there. HOHNER got his Vollmacht in mid-April, a few days after HITLER-DIETRICH.

## 19. RUMMEL

No one actual, though not official, deputy of HITLER after HITLER'S death, in the SA. He has a son or daughter, who  
can had expected, as oldest in rank in the SA, to lead the SA. Later he went to the SS, where he became Lottchenmeier.

## 20. RUMMEL AND THE VOLLMACHT

HOHNER thinks RUMMEL did little with his Vollmacht. He was summoned to Berlin by HITLER in about mid-April. HITLER-DIETRICH did not come over to HOHNER's side till near the end.

## 21. RUMMEL

RUMMEL had no direct part in the negotiations in Budapest, but RUMMEL informed him about them, and RUMMEL

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tried to get together for the American zone a counter-government against the Russian-sponsored one. He found candidates for it in Western Austria - GASTLWIR, DUMLER, LIEST, and others.

KREUZER went to Kitzbuehl, then to Bell an der See. It was planned to have the new Government come to Salzburg; to Glodde-Horstenau, who had the approval of Bishop REINHOLD, but it was physically impossible to get them together; KREUZER came to Salzburg, but nobody else.

GOETSCHE's Viennese contacts never got out of Vienna.

## 23. DR. HOMER

HOMER also remained in Vienna. KOHLER now says that he discussed the contact with HOMER on his first trip to Switzerland, but he himself felt that the trip to the U.S. to meet President ROOSEVELT was no longer practicable, and did not broach it, though this had been KREUZER's official reason for approving HOMER's trip.

## 23. GLADSON-MULLER

He had been initiated from the beginning in the negotiations, and KOHLER talked with him before and after each of his trips to Switzerland.

## 24. DR. ERNST LIEBLICH

KOHLER reported to KREUZER about 2 weeks after his second trip. He had left Switzerland on 16 April, spent about two days at home; so the visit was about 20 April; he saw KREUZER again first at Strobl, then two days or so later at Innsbruck. Obviously, only KREUZER had reported to KREUZER about his two trips. KREUZER said that went to Salzburg on 20 April to attend a rally; there was a meeting at Salzburg c. 25 April to which KREUZER was present; at this, KREUZER asked him to try to let KOHLER speak in his name in Switzerland.

KOHLER remarks that from the start, he and GOETSCHE had been the protagonists of the Austrian solution; KREUZER had had been lukewarm and uninterested, but had above all refused to undertake anything that might go counter to his fellow Nazis.

## 25. DR. ERNST LIEBLICH-POLITICAL PART

KOHLER met ERNST at Vienna on this trip, then had to leave, and returned to Vienna for ERNST's return; he managed to meet him again at the Italian border for a final time. On the trip he had a meeting with KREUZER, but had to leave, and got to Salzburg about 4-5 May. KREUZER left, and came to Berlin.

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HOMER saw CLARK-MORGAN and M. H. COOPER at the A.D., and discussed with ALMAGRO the internal situation between. CLARK went to Salzburg to see KIRKMAN; the three pro-posed Government members (see para 21) were informed of the plan.

HILDEBRAND intended to stay outside the Convention, and representative of the left and the right, set to do what was called "leading over" those groups to form a legal opposition to the new state. He thought of disappearing in the mountains to carry out this task.

## **26. THE CENTRAL BANK SYSTEM AND CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE, 1929-1933.**

With SCHIRALI (Vienna) there was no communication.

H. had no connections either with J.W.C., who was highly favorable, and had contact with K.N.G. and R.H.L.

With EICRUDDER, stubborn and wayfaring, there were no contacts.

SOURCE of Calzburg was also off the list, but H. points out that he turned favorable early.

HOMER was persecuted by HARRISBURG (including only in which) and by the military not to try to fight on. He tells of an Amherst court martial, at Ft. Ticonderoga, who wanted him to go to the American Indians, and was caught by the Major (John M. Clegg) in the mountains; escaped; his wife L. Brown, was born, he is now, informed of this, went to Harrisburg, and persuaded them to take over Ft. Ticonderoga. HOMER naturally had problems with that, and then the State tried to get him in debt, so he was forced to write him. HARRISBURG tried to get him over to their side, and they have done so; in very early days he was with the first group in the case were taken in Harrisburg.

HOBME had been correct with his information about your arrival in Tyrol at the end of April. He thinks there will be a meeting of RING's staff.

With RUELLIA OF CORDIFOLIUM there was no contact, but AGRIMONIA was in touch with it. The cells below the epidermis had

Please see no contact with WID AT 10:00 AM OF 06-06-2006

27. EX-12 AND 5711 PRACTICE 2003-2004

REINHOLD had contacts with Stenberg, head of the *Freie Volksfront*, Norwegian leftist, one of the old men of the resistance, who generally gave into optimism, in contrast to his wife, who gave him the Bayesian opposition gloominess. He was good-natured.

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HORST at the beginning of April. He thinks that there was a Munich clique of such old Nazis who had gone into a sort of opposition. Otherwise there were no connections with Bavarian groups, though H. thinks HORST was in contact with OSSAK. H. himself tried to arrange a meeting with OSSAK in Vienna but nothing came of it.

Another old Nazi who had become anti-Nazi was HOFMANN the photographer. H. had talked with him, found him strongly opposed to Hitler.

These Munich "anti-Nazi" elements, according to H., still have more than pacific resistance toward the Nazis, but they do not yet broad opposition at their Secretariate (in addition to the secretariat to OSSAK). H. suggested that HOFMANN, or another man of his party with whom he would be worth talking, should be used. The two most of this Munich group were G. and G. (last name unknown).

## 20. 17 APR 44 CO R FOR ALLEGED PIAK

SHORNEY says the point of contact should be HOFMANN to place some of his people, one additional man, in Austria, and H. says his people would also like to know if the man he suggests could be in the Morowolf. KARL ALTMAYER, the man from Vienna and Sitzburg named SKOLIK, is to be used. He has been given \$1000.00 money for OSSAK's expenses, and he is to be paid \$1000.00 more, which would be paid out on the first trip. The second trip is to be on a personal basis, and the amount will depend upon what was paid out on the first.

KALMANN and others during the conference plan after H.'s second trip to Switzerland, where they do not plan to conduct Morowolf activities in the West, while they might be continued in the East.

H. does not know what KALMANN's final position in the Morowolf was. He says he suggested participation at the time of H.'s first trip to Switzerland, and discussed it fully with H. on the second trip.

## 21. 17 APR 44 IN AUSTRIA

The Morowolf was not well organized in Austria. KALMANN's group had come down at the beginning of April to discuss a plan with the Comintern, so they could not go to see the Morowolf agents, who were to contact the Int. This was autumn because over the Nazis in Austria (?). Report of the Morowolf, and the only candidates for it would be Morojo youth.

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H. sees the greatest danger from the Werewolf in the fact that there still must be considerable cache of arms, especially MP's, placed by the Volksturm in the mountains.

The Werewolf, H. thinks, was kept organized in the Steyrer region, under LIEUTENANT WAGNER, who he does not know exactly. He thinks it may also have been well organized in Austria. He is still considering a telephone conversation with the agent in Vienna in which LIEUTENANT called up LIEUTENANT to talk for H., and LIEUTENANT arranged to send 5 or 6 loads of these from the Steyrer area to be used in case of need of supplies at Graz. H. believes it is the were not used in fighting; but were concealed; they were transported by the Volksturm, not by the Werewolves.

H. says that probably H.'s people broke into a different number stores of the Steyrwerke at Hobich, because NUDL of the Steyrwerke refused to supply arms to the Volksturm.

LIEUTENANT H. thinks, is in Salzburg at present. He was at Bad Aussee on 7 May, and probably is lurking around in the Tauren.

## 30. REUNION IN THE BALKANS

The Werewolf expected to re-claim H. A. and FA Stellera for the same sort of jobs as before. FA was given no information on his organization and on units effective.

The FA Stellera is to clear up their political operations in the Balkans with VI B.

H. says that the Werewolf people do not have any information service other than their own -- G.C. VI B and other parts of the RUMA were not in supply them with intelligence.

H. says that the forces of April by which VI B had to clear its political operations with VI B had very little political effect.

H. gives an instance of confusion -- VI B planned this winter to drop a Werewolf to blow up a railway line in the Carpathians, but VI B fortunately had their Hungarian partners clearly on it, and found these Hungarian partisans had blown up the railway long time before.

H. says NUDL can tell about the number of paratroops being trained by the Jagdwerewolves for the southwest. It is not often at Jaichau, where LIEUTENANT was in charge of this training.

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## 32. VIENNA TRAINING

VIENNA TRAINED FOUR A/F OPERATORS IN HUNGARY, AND FIVE OTHERS AT A SCHOOL IN KIRCHBERG, WHICH WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF BRITAIN, FOR WHOM ABOUT 16 OTHER OPERATORS WERE BEING TRAINED; BUT THROUGH HIS PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HENRY RAILLY, IN CHARGE OF THE SCHOOL, HE GOT HOLD OF THE OTHER 16 OPERATORS, AND REQUESTED THEM TO BE SENT TO THE AMERICAN SIDE.

## 32. HALDENECKE'S VOLUNTEER

HADENECKE THINKS THAT KREUZER WOULD HAVE BEEN SO BUSY TRAVELLING AROUND IN APRIL THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF HIS POWER, BECAUSE TRYING TO KEEP THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THEIR PLACES. A SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF THIS WAS TOLD TO HADENECKE BY PIERRE JEANNEAU, WHO HAD OVERHEARD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION. KREUZER TALKED WITH SIGMAR II, WHO WANTED TO BLOW UP THE BRIDGE AT LINDAU, IN WHICH OBJECTS OF WAR WERE STORED; KREUZER TALKED WITH ERNST, THE PEOPLE AT MUNICH, INCIDENTALLY, IN MARCH OR APRIL, AND THEY HAD A LOCAL RESISTANCE MEETING, largely social in character, IN WHICH THEY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE POST CRISIS, AND IN WHICH THEY DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE & BOOST IN THE EVENT OF THE SWISS TAKE-OVER. THIS TALK PLACE ABOUT 20 APRIL. KREUZER TALKED WITH HADENECKE AND TALKED AGAINST IT NOT TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE; THIS WAS ALSO SUGGESTED BY THE RESISTANCE PEOPLE, AND WAS SPREAD AROUND.

## 33. KREUZER'S APPROPRIATION OF HADENECKE'S

KREUZER AGREED WITH HADENECKE ON THE CONTENTS OF (MORE THAN ONE) A/F MESSAGES HE DECLINED TO SEND TO HADENECKE TO THE DISPOSITION OF HADENECKE, AND ACCORDING TO WHAT IS KNOWN IN THE DISPOSITION OF VIENNA TRAINING. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS KNOWN. KREUZER'S MESSAGES WERE TO POINT OUT THAT HADENECKE HAD APPROVED VIENNA TRAINING'S PROPOSAL TO MAKE VIENNA TRAINING USE THE ACCORDINGLY PREVIOUSLY, AND TO SEND VIENNA TRAINING TO LINDAU; VIENNA TRAINING COULD NOT EASILY POINTED OUT THAT HADENECKE NOW WANTED VIENNA TRAINING TO GO TO LINDAU, AND HADENECKE TO SALZBURG, WHILE HE, HADENECKE, HAD USED ALL THE MEANS OF HIS FULL POWER, AND ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN, MR. HADENECKE RECALLS THAT DR. RUDOLPH CAME FROM VIENNA. HE TALKED WITH DR. KOENIGSEGG, AND HE THINKS THAT THE PLANNED WERE TO GO FROM THE A/F SENDER HOME. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, FURTHER MSGS RECEIVED SINCE HE STARTED THE NEXT DAY FOR SWITZERLAND. (THIS WOULD FINISH THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE END OF APRIL).

## 34. VIENNA FROM MARCH 5/4/45

HADENECKE RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP FROM 3/4/45, AND THUS, ON 5/4/45, ARRIVED EARLY IN THE MORNING, VIENNA TRAINING (TO VIENNA), AND LATER ON VIENNA, WHERE HE MET WITH ERNST, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE PLACES FOR AN AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND ON 5/4/45, VIENNA TRAINING WENT THERE TO CONTACT HADENECKE IN VIENNA, AND TO CO-OPERATE THE EFFORTS FOR AN AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND HADENECKE TO

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get together with NEUTZER and through him with the Social Democrats. OHLER was to ask Dicke HARTMANN for his backing. ROBERT was to go to Salzburg and meet HARTMANN, Dr. CLOTH, and pass on information to ROBERT about the Nazis.

On 5 May, ROBERT went to Salzburg; HARTMANN had gone (8) to tell Hellmuth to discuss with OHLER and HARTMANN, and OHLER told ROBERT that LOHRMANN approved their ideas, but would not consent to having any clerical representatives in the Government, since he opposed politicising the Church.

ROBERT then returned to Austria.

## 35. KREISLER'S POSITION AND ACTIVITIES

On the night of 6 or 7 May, ROBERT came to Innsbruck, and told HARTMANN (as he did Hartmann that day also) that the HAUPTSTADT could not oppose the creation of a separate Austria, and was willing to give up the military part of the struggle to hold the Reduit. HARTMANN had decided to give up after his conference with HARTL at Innsbruck, but the final decision was taken at Augsburg.

## 36. STATEMENT OF ROBERT

ROBERT said he wanted to speak to ROBERT to urge on him the necessity of uniting with OHLER, and to tell him about the Heerstrasse plan. ROBERT said he got about 1 May, two delayed because of the lack of aircraft, but may have left later, though ROBERT thinks he is probably still in the South.

ROBERT adds that HARTL had been back at his residence for the rest of Osterreichskreis, and sent a classified telegram at that time placed OHLER and himself in the Ministry for Ecclesiastics. HARTL is from Bavaria, and HARTL and ROBERT may have been in contact with the disgruntled Nazis around Augsburg.

KREISLER had some position with KHM HARTL, possibly as representative of the Ministry for Ecclesiastics. HARTL was not instructed into the Austrian plans till the end, when HARTL informed him.

## 37. KREISLER, HARTL, AND OHLER

ROBERT was last with HARTL, presumably at Innsbruck, in mid-May. He is probably there, or has gone to the Alpine valleys near Innsbruck. If OHLER meets him again, ROBERT says, we should tell that we have obtained news of his "Alicia" world.

HARTL, who comes from Holland, is an advertising representative of Salzburg.